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Book Review 
Toward a Common Law for Undercover Investigations- a Book Re- 
view of ABSCAM ETHICS: MORAL ISSUES AND D E C E ~ O N  IN LAW 
ENFORCEMENT. Edited by Gerald M. Caplan.* Cambridge, Mass.: 
Ballinger Press. (1983) 147 pp. 
Reviewed by Bennett L. Gershman** 
In the afterglow of ABSCAM, and the looming shadows of 1984, con- 
cerned citizens are searching for emerging trends. Is American soci- 
ety becoming a police state with superficial democratic trappings? Or 
are the new secret tactics of the police merely a rational and noncoer- 
cive means to secure greater fieedom through more effective crime 
control? Questions such as these are being asked with increasing fie- 
quency, and neither the courts, legislators, social scientists, nor mor- 
alists have provided answers, much less a coherent framework in 
which to analyze the relevant factors or standards for resolution. 
Confusion abounds. Consider the following examples. 
Ten years ago, allegations of corruption in New York City's crimi- 
nal justice system led to the appointment of a special prosecutor with 
broad and independent powers of investigation. Traditional investi- 
gative methods proved ineffective because acts of corruption, such as 
bribery, ordinarily do not produce complainants, witnesses, or tangi- 
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ble evidence of wrongdoing. The discovery of criminal offenses in this 
covert, well-insulated, and mutually protective criminal justice sys- 
tem required ifltration and deception. The investigators devised an 
imaginative plan: they created a fictitious crime and subsequent ar- 
rest, with undercover agents playing the roles of victim, defendant, 
and arresting 0fficer.l The staged arrest proceeded routinely through 
the New York court system, tricking judges, court officials, and jurors. 
The bait was successful; evidence uncovered implicated several 
judges and lawyers in acts of ~orruption.~ Efforts to prosecute these 
officials, however, met with furious judicial condemnation. The un- 
dercover investigation was characterized by shocked courts as "foul, 
illegal and outrageous,"3 and "a perversion of the criminal justice 
~ystem."~ Clearly, although the end may have been laudable, the 
means were unjustifiable. 
Four years later, without specific allegations of corruption against 
any government official, federal law-enforcement officials launched a 
massive undercover investigation into legislative corruption. Code 
named ABSCAM,S the investigation was designed to test the honesty 
and integrity of high governmental officials by manufacturing oppor- 
tunities for their corruption. Undercover agents, assisted by a career 
swindler, pretended to be representatives of wealthy Arab sheiks 
who sought friendship and assistance from public officials in return 
for payment of huge bribes. Aided by corrupt intermediaries ignorant 
of the scam, roving undercover agents were able to lure several prom- 
inent congressmen in front of hidden cameras and ensnare them in 
corrupt transactions. The courts overwhelmingly endorsed the opera- 
1. For a discussion of this case, and the use of staged arrests generally, see 
Gershman, Entrapment, Shocked Consciences, and the Staged An-est, 66 Mm. L. REV. 
567 (1982). As Special Assistant Attorney General in the Office of the Special Prosecu- 
tor of the State of New York from 1973 to 1976, I investigated and prosecuted several 
corruption cases employing undercover techniques. In these prosecutions, one of the 
principal issues litigated was the propriety of such techniques. 
2. A similar investigation, "Operation Graylord," was recently conducted in Chi- 
cago. Staged arrests and undercover agents posing as corrupt prosecutors and judges 
were used to uncover extensive corruption within the criminal justice system. Several 
judges and lawyers have already been indicted. N.Y. Times, Dec. 15.1983, at  Al, coL 1. 
- - 
3. Rao v. ~adjar i ,  No. 75 ~ i v .  2376 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30,1975); Rao, Jr. v. Nadjari, No. 
75 Civ. 2377 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30. 1975). 
4. ~ i g r o n e  v. ~urta-gh, 46 ~ . ~ : 2 d  343, 347, 362 N.Y.S.2d 513, 517 (1974), affd, 36 
N.Y.2d 421, 330 N.E.2d 45, 369 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1975). For a similar condemnation, see 
United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670 (2d Cir. 1973) (Friendly, J.) (government's instiga- 
tion of bribery by a local assistant district attorney through the use of a staged arrest 
went beyond any proper prosecutorial role). 
5. The word is an acronym combining the Arst two letters of Abdul Enterprises, 
Ltd., a fictitious Middle Eastern corporation, and the word "scam," a slang expression 
for a swindle or confidence game. The Federal Bureau of Investigation originally cre- 
ated the organization in 1978 as a front to receive stolen property. In 1979, the FBI 
shifted its focus to that of uncovering political corruption, flrst in New Jersey, then 
among the members of Congress. See, e.g, Gershman, Abscam, the Judiciary, and the 
Ethics of Entrapment, 91 YALE LJ. 1565,1571-75 (1982). 
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tion.6 As one typical appellate panel observed: 
Given the special relationship between the public and those who 
serve the Government, it is inevitable that the public will call for, 
and law enforcement officials will rely upon, special investigative 
techniques to uncover insidious corruption. Modern crime fighting 
methods such as videotapes and carefully devised and supervised 
covert investigations often are the only means of discovering 
breaches of the fundamental mandate of one's ~ f f i ce .~  
Needless to say, the contrasting judicial responses to these two un- 
dercover investigations raise extremely complex and troubling ques- 
tions. Were the two investigations so dissimilar as to evoke such 
markedly dissimilar reactions? Is sneaking under judicial robes any 
less indispensable to discovering judicial corruption or any more jus- 
tifiable than sneaking into congressional chambers to discover legis- 
lative corruption? Were both undercover operations, and others like 
them, regardless of their success, so unreasonable and unfair, and 
their implications so frightening as to deserve condemnation not only 
legally, but also &om an ethical, social, and political standpoint as 
well? 
Covert police tactics, while seemingly inconsistent with a demo- 
cratic society, have long been used in American law enforcement 
without significant criticism.* Recently, however, such tactics have 
been subjected to sustained attack and have evoked a much more 
focused and less visceral reaction. Several reasons may account for 
this change. First, covert law-enforcement operations are no longer 
directed only against narcotics peddlers, gamblers, or organized- 
crime figures, but are now being aimed at persons of wealth, social 
prestige, and political pr~minence.~ Although indignation at this new 
direction may be spurred in part by class biases, such operations 
may also provoke latent fears that, like our ancestors in the Garden 
of Eden, no one is completely impervious to seductive temptations. 
Second, the dramatic increase in the use of undercover methods and 
the increasingly imaginative forms of the deception heighten the anx- 
iety that areas of society and personal relationships previously per- 
ceived as sanctuaries of confidentiality might become the next 
6. See United States v. Kelly, 707 F.2d 1460 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 264 
(1983); United States v. Williams, 705 F2d  603 (26 Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 524 
(1983); United States v. Myers, 692 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 2437 
(1983); United States v. Alexandro, 675 F.2d 34 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct 78 (1982); 
United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 
(1982). 
7. United States v. Alexandro, 675 F.2d 34, 43 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 78 
(1982). 
8. See, e.g, Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons, and 
Agent Provocateurs, 60 YALE L J .  1091,1091-96 (1951); Mikell, The Doctrine of Entrap- 
ment in the Federal Courts, 90 U. PA. L REV. 245,245-47 (1942). American law-enforce- 
ment authorities have used undercover tactics for over a century to enforce a variety of 
laws, such as those regarding immigration, Woo Wai v. United States, 223 F. 412 (9th 
Cir. 1915); gambling, State v. Torphy, 78 Mo. App. 206 (1899); bribery, People v. Mills, 91 
AD. 331.86 N.Y.S. 529, a f d ,  178 N.Y. 274,70 N.E. 786 (1904); obscenity, Grimm v. United 
States, 156 U.S. 604 (1895); vice, State v. Dingman, 232 S.W.2d 919 (Mo. 1950); and liquor, 
Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932). 
9. See Wilson, The Changing FBI - The Road to Abscatn, 59 PUB. INTEREST 3 
(1980); S. BOK, SECRETS 268 (1982). 
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targets for infiltration.1° Third, the development of new and sophisti- 
cated technologies for surveillance and information gathering gener- 
ate fears that these devices will permit broader and more intensive 
intrusions into personal privacy than ever before.11 Finally, the ab- 
sence of significa~t legal restraints on police undercover activities 
raises serious concerns about the potential for abuses of power. Al- 
though the fourth and fifth amendments empower the courts to exer- 
cise some control over traditional investigative procedures, such as 
arrests, searches, and interrogations,12 which usually are conducted 
without deception, these controls often do not apply to undercover 
investigations, which rely on secrecy for their success. Moreover, the 
entrapment defense offers little protection against the government's 
ability to instigate crimes, particularly when those persons instigated 
have demonstrated some predisposition toward criminal behavior.13 
Except for an absolutely shocking case, law-enforcement officials' 
ability to use infiltration, manipulation, and deceit to investigate, and 
even to manufacture crime, is largely unfettered by judicial 
controls.14 
ABSCAM Ethics: Moral Issues and Deception in Law Enforcement l5 
is a significant contribution to the public debate over the propriety of 
undercover tactics in criminal investigations. The book arose out of 
two conferences on deceptive law-enforcement techniques and police 
ethics held at Harvard University in 1981 and at the John Jay College 
of Criminal Justice of the City University of New York in 1982. The 
high level of debate at these conferences prompted the Police Foun- 
dation to ask Professor Gerald M. Caplan of The George Washington 
University National Law Center to assemble and edit the best papers 
10. The rate of increase in the FBI's use of undercover operations is staggering. 
From 1978 to 1981, the FBI initiated approximately 1,200 separate undercover opera- 
tions. By contrast, beginning in 1972 the FBI conducted on the average only about 50 
undercover operations a year. American Civil Liberties Union, The Lessons of AB- 
SCAM 4 5  (Oct. 10, 1982) (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter cited as ACLU Re- 
port]. The budget for such operations also increased dramatically, from $1 million in 
1977 to $4.8 million in 1981. Marx, W?w Really Gets Stung? Some Issues Raised by the 
New Police Undercover Work, in ABSCAM Emcs :  MORAL ISSUES AND D E C E ~ O N  IN 
LAW ENFORCEMENT, 66 (G. Caplan ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as ABSCAM ETHICS]. 
11. See, e.g, A. WESTIN, PRIVACY ANI) FREEDOM (i967). See also Hoffa v. United 
States, 385 U.S. 293,317 (1966) (Warren, CJ., dissenting) (The "unbridled use of elec- 
tronic recording equipment. . . used to invade privacy. . . appears to be increasingly 
prevalent in our country today."); Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323,341-42 (1966) 
(Douglas, J., dissenting) ('The aggressive breaches of privacy by the Government in- 
crease by geometric proportions."). 
12. See, e.g, Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE, & J. ISRAEL, MODERN C m ~ t  PROCEDURE, 
211437,543-665 (1980). 
13. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435 (1973); Park, The Entrapment 
Controversy, 60 .L. REV. 163,178 n.44 (1976). 
14. See i n f a  text accompanying notes 71-81. 
15. Supra note 10. 
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for publication. The result is a collection of seven essays dealing with 
the specifics of ABSCAM, the use of informants in law enforcement, 
the selection of targets for investigation, strategies for dealing with 
victimless crimes, and the social and ethical implications of the new 
police undercover operations. The essays vary in their approaches 
and methodologies. Several of them are sensitive, enlightening, and 
provocative; a few are superficial and dull. Notwithstanding its title, 
the book transcends any particular undercover operation and pro- 
vides a framework for further analysis of one of the most difficult and 
controversial issues facing law-enforcement officials today. The book 
demonstrates the need for new legal approaches to the problem of 
police undercover work, both to ensure fair and rational policies and 
to provide safeguards against abuse. One such approach, which I 
shall discuss below,16 is to create a new common law for undercover 
investigations, based on the overriding public interests in controlling 
law-enforcement misconduct and protecting citizens against govern- 
mental oppression. 
The ABSCAM investigation is chronicled and defended by Irvin B. 
Nathan, formerly a deputy assistant attorney general in the Depart- 
ment of Justice and coordinator of the ABSCAM prosecutions.17 I 
tend to agree with his assessment that, by every objective standard, 
ABSCAM was a huge success. A senior United States senator, six 
congressmen, a mayor, and an assortment of other public officials 
and attorneys were convicted of corruption, usually with videotaped 
evidence of the crime in progress. Every conviction was affirmed on 
appeal. One congressman was expelled from office, some resigned, 
and others were defeated for reelection. The operation's effect in de- 
terring corruption, though diacult to measure, probably has been 
substantial. 
In addressing one of the most controversial issues raised by AB- 
SCAM, Nathan denies that prospective defendants were impermissi- 
bly targeted: "All of the public officials who became involved in 
ABSCAM came into the operation as a result of the representations 
and actions of corrupt intermediaries," such as Angelo Errichetti, 
mayor of Camden, New Jersey, who provided the FBI undercover 
agent with a written list of names of those he alleged were corrupt 
federal and state politicians in New Jersey.18 Failure to have pursued 
these allegations would have occasioned a scandal and may have pro- 
voked the charge of a "cover up." Moreover, FBI operatives were 
given careful ground rules designed to thwart unscrupulous middle- 
men and to eliminate any possibility that a subject would be lured 
into criminality without fully appreciating the illegal nature of the 
16. See infia text accompanying notes 85-108. 
17. Nathan, ABSCAM: A Fair and Eflective Method for Fighting Public Corruptim 
in ABSCAM ETHICS, mpra  note 10, at 1. 
18. Id at 4. A recent report evaluating the ABSCAM operation, based largely on 
congressional testimony, disputes this claim and points to evidence indicating that 
ABSCAM operations were seeking out corrupt politicians in New Jersey before Er- 
richetti ever became involved in the operation and before the FBI could reasonably 
have suspected a pattern of prior criminal activity. See ACLU Report, supra note 10, at 
12-19. 
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transaction.lg 
Plainly, the government "set the bait" by having its undercover 
agents tell the corrupt intermediaries that they were willing to pay 
for political favors. But, Nathan argues, the government did not know 
who would bite and made no effort to push the bait toward any partic- 
ular individual. He suggests that ABSCAM resembled common un- 
dercover investigations into urban crime in which police in "granny 
squads" disguise themselves as elderly women with handbags visible 
and ready to be snatched. The entrapment defense was rarely in- 
voked, Nathan observes, probably because it would have been "far- 
fetched" to suggest that sophisticated public officials were so 
impressionable as to be enticed into doing something they would 
otherwise not be inclined to do.20 
Acknowledging that every law-enforcement procedure, not just the 
ABSCAM operation, is subject to abuse, Nathan calls for reliance on 
the basic integrity and decency of prosecutors and investigators, fol- 
lowing elaborate administrative guidelines,2l under close judicial 
scrutiny, and aided by vigilant defense counsel. The "good news, at 
least for law-abiding citizens," he concludes, is that sophisticated un- 
dercover operations to combat crime "represent the wave of the 
future."22 
Two of the major issues in ABSCAM- the use of informants and 
the selection of targets - figure prominently in the book. Peter 
Reuter, a senior economist at the Rand Corporation, focuses on infor- 
mants, the "dirty secret" of police Because of the public's 
high expectations of police performance, some police, Reuter claims, 
have entered into long-term relationships with informants, whose 
frequent criminal behavior is tolerated, and even permitted, on a reg- 
ular basis. In effect, the police are "licensing criminals," and there is 
very little control over this sordid practice. In the enforcement of nar- 
19. These ground rules apparently did not provide s a c i e n t  safeguards. The FBI 
initially authorized the establishment of bribe-offer meetings with 27 public officials 
solely on the basis of representations from middlemen. Although two authorizations 
were cancelled, the others were not. Five of the officials never attended such a meet- 
ing. Twenty meetings were held but only 12 convictions resulted. Congressman Ed- 
ward Patton of New Jersey and Senator Larry Pressler of South Dakota declined a 
bribe offer in front of the FBI cameras. See United States v. Myers, 527 F. Supp. 1206, 
1225 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), a f d  in pa* 692 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1982); ACLU Report, supra note 
10, at 6. 
20. Nathan, supra note 17, at 13. 
21. In the aftermath of ABSCAM, the United States Justice Department and the 
FBI issued comprehensive guidelines for undercover operations. See Department of 
Justice, Office of the Attorney General, Attorney General's Ouidelines on FBI Under- 
covw Operations (1981). In an earlier article, I suggested that the protections purport- 
edly provided by these guidelines is illusory. See Gershman, supra note 5, a t  1586 
n.lOO. 
22. Nathan, supra note 17, at 16. 
23. Reuter, Licensing Criminals: Police and Informants, in insCAM E m c s ,  
supra note 10, at 100-17. 
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cotics laws, for example, such transactions are commonplace. Indeed, 
Reuter's essay recalls my own experiences as a prosecutor in New 
York County when, during arraignment proceedings, members of the 
police narcotics unit often asked me to intercede with the judge for 
the release of an informant recently arrested by another police 
squad. On one occasion, I was even approached by federal drug- 
enforcement agents on behalf of a purportedly valuable informant 
who was about to stand trial on major kidnapping charges. 
Reuter believes that attempts to control this practice by promulgat- 
ing guidelines or by requiring that informants be registered are of 
questionable value. Such controls tolerate broad discretion, are 
easily evaded, and can produce more secrecy and diminished control 
within police agencies. He does not specify the seriousness of this 
problem2* and does not grapple with the overriding moral question of 
whether police-licensed crime should ever be tolerated in a free soci- 
ety. Reuter assumes, I think incorrectly, that such a practice is a nec- 
essary means justified by a legitimate end, and that "[elither we 
must accept the tensions created by the ill-monitored licensing or we 
must lower our demands upon the police to apprehend certain 
classes of ~rirninals."~~ 
The problem of informants is considered in a skillful and provoca- 
tive essay by Sanford Levinson, a professor at the University of 
Texas Law School. Professor Levinson presents a constitutional and 
ethical analysis of the government's use of informants and the "hid- 
den costs" of infiltration and deceit.26 Spies are a product of classical 
liberalism, he suggests, enabling a paranoid government to invade 
the private lives of those who might be plotting its destruction. Using 
as a model the archetypal informant, Judas Iscariot, Professor Levin- 
son offers a typology of informants and develops a concept that might 
be termed a morality of betrayal. The first type of informant is the 
"snitch," who betrays another's confidence without the disguise of 
deceit. Because all relationships are contingent anyway, Professor 
Levinson believes an autonomous choice to betray should be 
respected, though he does not fully explain what constitutes an "au- 
tonomous choice." Certainly, testimony elicited by a grant of immu- 
nity is not autonom~us.~~ To a lesser degree, neither is a promise of 
leniency to an accomplice in exchange for his or her testimony.28 But 
what about a person who "snitches" to cunry favor with the govern- 
ment? Is such a choice autonomous? In considering the autonomous 
choice to betray, Professor Levinson must also confront the law of 
24. He suggests that characteristics of some federal agencies like the FBI and the 
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) make it unlikely that many agents can enter 
into unmonitored arrangements with informants that violate the agencies' rules. I d  at 
lie 
25. Id  at 102. 
26. Levinson, Under Cover: The Hidden Costs of Infiltration, in ABSCAM ETHICS, 
supra note 10, at 43. 
27. New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450,459 (1979) (such immunized testimony "is 
the essence of coerced testimonv"). 
28. Cf: Napue v. Illinois, 360 C.S. 264,267-70 (1959) (promise of leniency may induce 
p e i u v ) .  
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privileges. He believes that although American law generally is un- 
concerned with protecting intimate relationships, it does recognize 
the existence of legal privileges that seek to protect the intimacy of 
certain relationships by barring autonomous choices to betray specfic 
 confidence^.^^ A second type of informant is the double agent, who 
exploits what was once an authentic relationship to induce the reve- 
lation of secrets. Here, the government initiates t h ~  betrayal by in- 
ducing a person to infiltrate the confidence of a friend, neighbor, or 
lover to gather incriminating information secretly.30 Under this typol- 
ogy, however, the infiltration need not be governmentally engineered 
to make it "socially subversive"; the informant just as easily could be 
a newspaper reporter who betrays a trust for a story. A third type of 
informant presents a wholly false self from the outset. No genuine 
relationship ever existed, and the informant must employ deceit to 
gain the confidence of the target.31 
Types two and three are the "moral equivalent to.  . . violence,. . . 
indeed torture," in their capacity to destroy private realms of love, 
intimacy, and friendship.32 To the extent that persons are unable to 
trust "normal appearances," social disorder is created. Paradoxically, 
this erosion of trust, quite apart from its moral implications, will 
make successful infiltration for purposes of crime control more diffi- 
cult. The Constitution broadly sanctions spying and deceit, Professor 
Levinson observes, notwithstanding the protections of the fourth 
amendment. As the Supreme Court repeatedly has stated in author- 
izing the government's broad license to spy, eavesdropping and be- 
trayal are "inherent in the conditions of human society."33 Some 
governmental deception may be defensible, he concludes, particu- 
larly where the police spy on persons who have previously expressed 
a willingness to engage in criminal activity" Although he does not 
- 
29. See, e.g, 8 J .  WIGMORE, VIDENCE $8 2285-2396 (McNaughton rev. 1961). The 
Supreme Court recently modified the spousal privilege, so that one spouse could not 
bar the other from exercising the autonomous choice to betray the spouse's confi- 
dence. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40,53 (1980). Nevertheless, in most American 
jurisdictions, the marital testimonial privilege still protects confidential communica- 
tions from disclosure even if one spouse voluntarily desires to make such disclosure. 
See 8 J. WIGMORE at $$ 2336-2338. 
30. A good example of this type is found in the events giving rise to Hoffa v. United 
States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966). Edward Partin, a p end and associate of Hoffa, frequently 
visited Hoffa while Hoffa was preparing for a federal trial involving violations of the 
Taft-Hartley Act. Partin apparently was a paid federal informant, who reported back to 
the government agents his conversations with Hofh that disclosed Hoffa's efforts to 
bribe members of the jury. Id. at 297-98. 
31. The undercover agents in the ABSCAM operation exemplify this type of 
informant. 
32. Levinson, supra note 26, at 51. 
33. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427,465 (1963) (Brennan, J. dissenting). See 
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 749 (1971) (plurality opinion); Hoffa v. United 
States, 385 U.S. 293,302 (1966). 
34 One such decision which Professor Levinson apparently agrees with is Lewis 
v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966). An undercover agent, misrepresenting his iden- 
tity, was invited into defendant's home on two occasions for the purpose of buying 
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specifically discuss the issue, I believe Professor Levinson would find 
undercover operations like ABSCAM, which involve extensive infil- 
tration to test the morality of government officials, both dehumaniz- 
ing and socially destructive. 
In a surprising denouement, Professor Levinson proposes that the 
"private realm of trust and intimacy" should be protected by re- 
dressing a constitutional imbalance and removing the protections of 
the fifth amendment- "the real villain of the piece9'- as a "trade-off' 
for greater fourth amendment safeguards of privacy.35 Apparently he 
regards the fifth amendment as the villain because it prevents law- 
enforcement ofllcials from directly asking a defendant to explain evi- 
dence that suggests criminal behavior.36 As a result, the government 
is compelled to use techniques such as informants to secure 
convictions. 
Professor Levinson's attempt to relate the fifth amendment's 'pro- 
tection against compelled self-incrimination to the use of deception 
to gather evidence of crime is problematic. The privilege against self- 
incrimination does not appear especially relevant to operations like 
ABSCAM, in which all the incriminating statements were obtained 
secretly, or to any other undercover investigation of organized crime 
or official corruption. The defendants in these cases are usually so- 
phisticated and knowledgeable in the law, and have high-priced law- 
yers to protect their rights. They are unlikely to make the type of self- 
incriminating statements protected by the fifth amendment. Yet the 
poor and uneducated, who are usually arrested for traditional street 
crimes, would be severely disadvantaged by this "trade-off' because 
they are more easily induced to incriminate themselves. Professor 
Levinson's proposal is risky, as he himself acknowledges. Relinquish- 
ing the right to silence on the assurance of enhanced safeguards of 
privacy might constitute the ultimate betrayal of all. 
The problem of selecting the target of undercover operations is dis- 
cussed by Lawrence W. Sherman, director of research for the Police 
Foundation and professor of criminology at the University of Mary- 
drugs. No reasonable expectations of privacy can be grounded upon such representa- 
tions of criminal behavior, Professor Levinson believes. He would caution, however, 
that for such undercover activity to be permissible the prospective conduct must gen- 
erally be accepted as criminal, and the undercover agent must learn nothing more 
about the person than his or-her continued willingness to violate the law. Levinson, 
supra note 26, at 55. Nevertheless, is there not a distinction of constitutional magni- 
tude between a householder who invites a friend into his home, clearly taking the risk 
that the friend will "snitch" (Levinson's Type I informant) and law-enforcement con- 
duct that actively "plants" an agent inside the person's home to secure incriminating 
evidence (Levinson's Type III informer)? See Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323,347 
(1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting); infia text accompanying notes 99-102. 
35. Levinson, supra note 26, at 59. 
36. Id. Cf: Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965)(fifth amendment forbids 
both comments by the prosecutor on the accused's silence and instruction by the court 
that silence is evidence of guilt). Several eminent scholars and jurists also believe that 
the privilege against self-incrimination has outlived its usefulness, but for reasons dif- 
ferent h m  those of Professor Levinson. See 7 J. BENTHAM, THE WORKS OF JEREMY 
BENTHAM 445-49 (1843); Wigmore, N m  Tenetur Seipsum Prodere, 5 HARV. L REV. 71, 
85-86 (1891); Friendly, The FiifM Amendment Tomorrow: The Case For Const i tut io~l  
Change, 37 U. CIN. L REV. 671, 671-72 (1968). 
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land.37 He begins by describing the class bias inherent in traditional 
law-enforcement techniques which target the poor and minority 
groups in the investigation of street crimes. By contrast, "proactive" 
undercover methods -the currently fashionable term for police tac- 
tics seeking to prevent certain crimes - are more often aimed at per- 
sons of wealth and high social status. "Deception is the only way to 
even up the score between the rich and the poor criminals," Profes- 
sor Sherman believes.38 Yet, although no moral outrage is exhibited 
when deceptive techniques are applied to drug pushers or organized- 
crime figures, quite the opposite reaction occurs when persons of 
wealth or political prominence are exposed to undercover investiga- 
tions. Such operations, including ABSCAM, often are characterized 
as witch hunts, fishing expeditions, or political vendettas. To allay 
such criticism, to make target selection more equitable, and to in- 
crease law-enforcement productivity, Professor Sherman proposes a 
radical procedure to select targets fairly. Rather than selecting indi- 
vidual targets based on an inductive method of tips or leads, which 
often produces a biased sample and results in wasteful efforts (al- 
though he offers no empirical evidence for these conclusions), Pro- 
fessor Sherman proposes selecting identifiable groups deductively, 
based on the probability that some members of this group are com- 
mitting crimes, and then launching an investigation against randomly 
selected members of the group. Indeed, this is precisely the process 
used by law-enforcement officials when they establish roadblocks to 
catch intoxicated motorists, customs checkpoints to intercept drug 
trafiickers, or random audits of income tax returns.39 Professor Sher- 
man's unusual three-point proposal includes: the promulgation of the 
investigative plan through administrative rulemaking to give affected 
groups an opportunity to debate the proposal; the articulation of ex- 
plicit criteria for selecting crimes and population groups, such as 
numbers of lives lost, or degree of threat to democratic government; 
and the provision of proper notice to the target groups (personal Iet- 
ters or public advertisements) that they might be exposed to decep- 
tive investigations. The disadvantages of his plan, Professor Sherman 
concedes, are both a sacrifice of the element of surprise and the d B -  
culty of defining target groups in sufficiently general categories. On 
the other hand, he maintains that deductive target selection would 
have a significant deterrent impact, would be more productive than 
traditional methods of target selection through tips or leads, and 
would be ethically superior because it would remove any stigma from 
37. Sherman, From Whodunit to W?LO Does It: Fairness and Target Selection in De- 
ceptive Investigations, in ABSCAM E T H I C S , ~ ~ ~ ~  note 10, at 118. 
38. Id. at 121. 
39. See, e.g., United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606,607 (1977) (customs checkpoint 
search); United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891,893-94 (1975) (vehicle checkpoint search). 
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people who are tested and commit no crime.* 
Professor Sherman's proposal, while imaginative and provoca- 
tive, is unrealistic. What do law-enforcement authorities do with 
Errichetti's list of corrupt public officials? Throw it in the lottery? As- 
suming the existence of a desire to investigate the judiciary based on 
allegations of corruption, isn't it unrealistic to expect self-interested 
judges or attorneys to participate in a public debate over whether 
they should be randomly selected for corrupt overtures? Are there 
not ethical and social, to say nothing of constitutional, problems in- 
herent in using factors like race or gender in selecting classes to be 
in~est igated?~~ 
The problem of structuring undercover investigations to maximize 
effectiveness and minimize intrusiveness is discussed by two of the 
authors. Neither of these essays is particularly enlightening. Mark H. 
Moore, professor of criminal justice policy at Harvard University's 
Kennedy School of Government, offers a somewhat turgid analysis of 
law-enforcement strategies for dealing with so-called "invisible" 
crirnesP2 Detection of offenses such as public or political corruption, 
narcotics trafficking, and organized crime usually requires law-en- 
forcement officers to position themselves in strategic locations to ob- 
serve and report the offenses. Such enforcement efforts, however, are 
likely to be dominated by the most intrusive undercover techniques, 
including extensive and intensive surveillance, targeting of specific 
individuals, coercion of witnesses, use of informants and undercover 
agents, and instigation and entrapment into committing crimes. The 
challenge to the government, Professor Moore argues, is to develop 
new and possibly unconventional strategies to attack effectively in- 
visible offenses, while simultaneously protecting the important social 
values of privacy, investigative rationality, fairness, and economic ef- 
ficiency. Yet, Professor Moore insists it is premature to formulate 
general policies governing the use of undercover techniques, and that 
society should resist the temptation to regulate their use without suf- 
ficient and systematic experimentation, documentation, and analysis. 
He argues that policies and legal rules governing undercover activi- 
ties should not be developed in the courts through "ambiguous con- 
stitutional principles" but, rather, in administrative agencies and "in 
the more ambiguous realm of social policy where diverse values com- 
pete without a clear hierar~hy."~~ According to Professor Moore, the 
development of policies in this area should be considered primarily 
an administrative problem whose solution might have constitutional 
40. Sherman, supra note 37, at 125-29. 
41. See Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721,728 (1969) (detention for interrogation and 
fingerprinting based on race violates the fourth amendment absent probable cause); 
Oyler v. Boles, 368.U.S. 448 (1962) (selective enforcement of statute enhancing punish- 
ment for habitual criminals does not violate equal protection as long as the selection is 
not deliberately based on an unjustifiable standard such as race or religion). One 
should note the increasing use of police "profSles" of suspected criminals as an investi- 
gatory tool, particularly in narcotics investigations. See United States v. Mendenhall, 
446 U.S. 544,564-65 (1980); Florida v. Royer, 103 S.Ct. 1319,1322 (1983). 
42. Moore. Invisible Offenses: A Ahallme to Minimallu Intrusive Law Enforce- 
.merit, in ABSCAM ~ ~ n r c < s u p r a  note 10, at"17. 
., 
43. Id. at 18. 
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implications. The policy-making agency should represent broad so- 
cial interests in civil liberties, fair law enforcement, and justice, and 
should be allowed to experiment "so that we can find out what is re- 
ally at stake, and base our policies on experien~e."~~ 
I am far less sanguine than Professor Moore that agencies such as 
the FBI and the Justice Department will be suEiciently sensitive to 
values of personal liberty. Nor do I believe that the development of 
rules for undercover operations realistically can or should take place 
outside the legal system, particularly if the consequences to those 
victimized by Professor Moore's "experiments" can be so draconian. 
Although empirical analysis might be able to demonstrate whether 
operations like ABSCAM really are effective in curbing corruption 
and are "cost-efficient," values like privacy and the ability to trust 
%orma1 appearances" are not as easily quantifiable. Society does not 
need more "experiments" to "find out what is at stake." Most Ameri- 
cans realize what is at stake; the question is whether society is will- 
ing to pay the price.45 
Wayne A. Kerstetter, a former police official in New York and Illi- 
nois, and presently a professor of criminal justice at the University of 
Illinois at Chicago, offers his "administrative perspective" of under- 
cover investigations.* It is superficial and banal. He asserts that an 
administrator must make tough decisions, balance competing social 
interests, look to potential costs, and proceed cautiously. Professor 
Kerstetter merely restates the obvious without providing any deeper 
understanding. His conclusion is equally unenlightening: "Ultimately 
the consequences of using deception must be balanced against the 
consequence of not using it."47 
By contrast, Gary T. Marx, a professor of sociology at the Massa- 
chusetts Institute of Technology, provides a sensitive, provocative, 
and disturbing essay, discussing the social implications of the new 
police undercover work48 Issues raised by recent undercover adven- 
tures like ABSCAM, Professor Marx claims, go far beyond simply 
whether a particular official was predisposed to take a bribe. Rather, 
they relate to whether the vastly more intrusive undercover tech- 
niques used today signal the emergence of a "totalitarian fortress."49 
Professor Marx documents the upsurge in both the nature and scale 
of covert law-enforcement activities over the last fifteen years, the 
sharply increased funding for such operations, and related law- 
enforcement innovations such as strike forces and witness-protection 
44. Id. at 39. 
45. Id. 
46. Kerstetter, Undercover Investigations: An Administrative Perspective, in AB- 
SCAM ETHICS, supra note 10, at 135. 
47. Id. at 145. 
48. Marx, supra note 10, at 65. 
49. Id. at 96. 
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programs.50 One of the principal reasons for this change, he suggests, 
is the constitutional restrictions on law-enforcement officers' ability 
to acquire evidence and the consequent development of imaginative 
methods to circumvent these restrictions through informants, gov- 
ernment agents, infiltration, and electronic s~fveillance.~~ 
There is good reason for the public and press to be pleased with 
these new police operations. The tactics have proved effective, con- 
viction rates are high, street security may be increased through the 
knowledge that anyone may be a police officer, and the courts have 
endorsed the techniques. Yet, because secrecy surrounds these oper- 
ations, the public's perception may be distorted. Little is known 
about the mistakes, abuses, and costs of these  operation^.^^ Professor 
Marx dissects the problematic aspects of undercover police work, ob- 
serving that American police, in contrast to those in many European 
countries, are permitted broad latitude in generating conditions for 
crime, in fashioning integrity tests of public and political officials, and 
in undermining a target's free will through trickery, coercion, and se- 
ductive temptations. Professor Marx also comments on the adverse 
effects on the police undercover agents, detailing the severe social 
and psychological consequences that can result from "playing the 
crook"53 He discusses the dangers of informants,"the weakest link in 
the undercover system," and the abuses stemming from their illegal, 
crime-provoking, and manipulating a~t ivi t ies .~~ Professor Marx is 
most effective in describing the harm to innocent third parties from 
undercover operations. Although much of this harm may never be 
realized, a good deal is known about the crimes committed by infor- 
mants, the trauma of victimization, the effects on small businesses of 
competition from proprietary fronts run by the police, harmful pub- 
licity, and the human suffering from misplaced t r U ~ t . ~ ~  
Moreover, how do we measure the effectiveness of undercover op- 
erations? Do such operations decrease crime? Or do they cause more 
crime than otherwise would be committed? Who is being arrested? 
Are they &st-time offenders or habitual criminals? Are they incom- 
petent offenders or experienced criminals? Research is limited, and 
50. Id. at 66. See ACLU Report. suDra note 10. at 56. 
. - 
51. Ma- supra note 10, a(68. 
52. Undercover flascos occasionally come to light. In "Operation Frontload" for 
example, the FBI investigated organizGd crime in &e const6ction industry by using 
an insurance expert in an undercover role. In seeking his certification, the FBI repre- 
sented him to the insurance company as a "straight arrow," when they knew full well 
that he had a criminal record and had agreed to become an informer to avoid serving a 
nine-year prison sentence. In the course of his work, he obtained over 800,000 in fees 
and issued worthless insurance "performance bonds" to construction companies, cost- 
ing these companies and insurance brokers more than $60 million in business losses. 
No indictments resulted in this case. N. Y. Times, May 18,1979, at Al, coL 1. In another 
flasco, entitled "Operation Corkscrew," the FBI sought to investigate corruption by 
municipal court judges in Cleveland, Ohio. For this operation, the FBI enlisted one of 
the court bailiffs as an undercover agent. The bailiff, however, had other ideas. He in- 
duced some of his friends to pretend to be judges and to accept bribes. The bailiff 
pocketed $85,000 of the bribe money, until the FBI inadvertently became aware one 
year later that it had been "stung!' Wall St. J., Oct. 28,1983, at 1, coL 1. 
53. Marx, supra note 10, at 78. 
54. Id. at 80-83. 
55. Id at 83-86. 
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its conclusions are not very definitive. Professor Marx concludes that 
ABSCAM may be a portent of the subtle and perhaps irreversible 
changes in social control in this country. By secretly gathering infor- 
mation and facilitating crime under controlled conditions, the police, 
like the modern corporation, may be able to manipulate our demand 
for their services. Such a market, Professor Marx warns, is subject to 
exploitation and misuse by the indiscriminate use of undercover op- 
erations. American society is fragmented enough without the govern- 
ment adding new layers of repression, suspicion, and distrust. There 
is a need, Professor Marx says, for careful analysis and public debate 
as to whether these new methods of law enforcement are benign or 
malignant.56 
111 
ABSCAM Ethics does not contain any new or startling revelations 
about excesses in law-enforcement investigations. Society has known 
for some time of the increasing reliance by the FBI and other law- 
enforcement agencies on espionage, idtration, and deceit. Society 
has also been made aware of the "dirty secret" of informants, of the 
inequitable targeting of potential criminals, of the modern develop- 
ments in electronic eavesdropping and other forms of surveillance 
and information gathering, of the ability of law-enforcement agencies 
to create new crimes and spawn new criminals, and of the passivity 
of the courts in controlling law-enforcement excesses. But in addition 
to providing a useful and comprehensive restatement of these 
problems, the book provides some unusual ethical and social per- 
spectives often missing from previous discussions, notably those 
found in the essays by Professors Levinson and Marx. And to the ex- 
tent that ABSCAM Ethics demonstrates the absence of principled 
and meaningful norms to limit excesses of law-enforcement power, it 
can provide a catalyst to thoughtful discussions regarding the estab- 
lishment of such norms. As a contribution to this dialogue, in order to 
provide a more coherent framework in which to analyze the central 
issues, I propose to outline what I perceive as an emerging common 
law to control undercover police behavior. 
It should be emphasized at the outset that law-enforcement agen- 
cies already enjoy tremendous latitude and flexibility in investigating 
covert offenses without the need to resort to manufactured crimes or 
integrity tests. In investigating an offense that has been or is likely to 
be committed, law-enforcement agencies always can employ tradi- 
tional investigative techniques which rely on witnesses, tangible 
proof, and visual surveillance for evidence. But if these methods are 
unavailable or ineffective, agencies have ample other means to inves- 
56. Id. at 90-96. 
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tigate successfully. For example, they can eavesdrop electronically, 
admittedly necessitating a judicial warrant to wiretap or plant a 
but requiring no warrant to install pen registers;58 beepers;59 
cameras, with one party's consent;60 or to place a hidden microphone 
on an agent.61 In addition, without the need for any warrant or prob- 
able cause, and over claims of privilege, agencies may obtain a vast 
array of personal and business records and doc~men t s ;~~  they may 
use infiltration, spies, deceit, and informants without any factual 
showing whatsoever;63 and may use utilize one of the most coercive 
law-enforcement tools - the investigating grand jury - to force the 
disclosure of protected inf~rmation.~~ Furthermore, law-enforcement 
agencies have the authority to .use coercive measures such as grants 
of immunity to compel testimony:65 they may engage in other conced- 
edly illegal investigative tactics to obtain inf~rmation~~ and may ex- 
ploit new and far-reaching criminal laws like the Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations statute (RICO)F7 in addition 
57. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,354-56 (1967); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 
41, 55-56 (1967). 
58. smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735,745-46 (1979). 
59. United States v. Knotts, 103 S.Ct. 1081,1087 (1983) (use of beeper to electroni- 
cally track a moving vehicle not a fourth amendment search). But see United States v. 
Cassity, 631 F.2d 461,464-65 (6th Cir. 1980) (warrantless use of beeper to track persons 
in their homes violated fourth amendment). 
60. United States v. Alexandro, 675 F2d 34,37 n.11 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 
78 (1982). 
61. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971). 
62. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435,446 (1976) (examining financial records); 
Fisher v. United States. 425 U.S. 391,396-98 (1976) (examining records in possession of 
attorney). In response to Miller, Congress enacted the Right to Financial Privacy Act 
of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630,92 Stat. 3641,3697 (codified at 12 U.S.C. $83401-3422 (1982)), 
which requires that the customer be notified of law enforcement's desire for the infor- 
mation and his right to challenge it in court, unless the government obtains a "protec- 
tive order" by showing that such notice would seriously jeopardize the investigation 
63. Ample support for this proposition is provided by the famous 1966 trilogy of 
Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293,311, Osborn v. United States 385 U.S. 323,331-32, and 
Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 208-11. See the ABSCAM decisions cited supra 
note 6. 
64. The grand jury's vast inquisitory powers accord with the oft-stated principle 
that "the public has a right to every man's evidence." United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 
683,709 (1974) (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665,668 (1972)). The powers of the 
nd jury to compel testimony, and the lack of constitutional safeguards to witnesses, 
g e  been emphasized repeatedly by the Supreme Court. See United States v. Wash- 
ington, 431 U.S. 181, 188-90 (1977); United States v. Wong, 431 U.S. 174, 178-80 (1977); 
United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564,571,580-84 (1976). For a discussion of the use 
of the grand jury's broad investigatory powers to trap witnesses into perjury, see 
Gershman, The Perjury nap,  129 U. PA. L REV. 624 (1981). 
65. United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564,575 (1976). As to the scope of immu- 
nity conferred, see Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441.448-58 (1972). For a discus- 
sion of immunity laws and procedures generally, see Gershman, supra note 64, at  648 
n.91. 
- 66. United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980) (government's deliberate violation 
of a third party's fourth amendment rights does not bar the use of illegally seized evi- 
dence against defendant); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976) (government may 
use in .IRS civil assessment proceeding evidence illegally seized from defendant); 
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (illegally seized evidence may be used 
before grand jury). 
67. 18 U.S.C. 1961-1968 (1976). Parts of this important chapter of the Organized 
Crime Control Act of 1970. Pub. L. No. 91-452.84 Stat. 922. have been favorablv ~ a s s e d  
upon by the Supreme court. See United states v. G k e t t e ,  452 U.S. 5% 11981); 
Russello v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 296 (1983). 
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to the broad conspiracy doctrine.68 These powerful weapons, though 
open to considerable abuse, have proved extremely effective, in in- 
vestigating and prosecuting not only narcotics offenses and organized 
crime, but also white-collar crime and political corr~pt ion.~~ 
Law-enforcement authorities have not, however, been completely 
satisfied with these techniques. To "prevent" crime before it occurs, 
law-enforcement agencies have entered into the crime business, es- 
tablishing, supplying, and even directing a huge array of illegal enter- 
prises, including the manufacture of bootleg whiskey?O drug 
manufacturing and distribution, 71 ~ounterfeiting?~ the operation of 
illegal bars and  restaurant^?^ fencing stolen rnerchandi~e?~ and sell- 
ing fraudulent insurance.75 They have committed crimes76 and insti- 
gated others to commit crimes by using violenceyV and 
intimidation and deceit.79 They have lured into criminality persons 
who are weak and inexperiencedFO as well as former offenders who 
have tried to reforms1 In reviewing these tactics, the courts have only 
rarely intervened. 
68. 18 U.S.C. 5 371 (1976). As Learned Hand observed in an oft-stated passage, con- 
spiracy is "the darling of the modern prosecutor's nursery." Harrison v. United States, 
7 F.2d 259,263 (2d Cir. 1925). The awesome scope of the conspiracy doctrine was also 
noted by Justice Jackson, concurring in Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440,445- 
58 (1949). 
69. The tremendous inroads made by law enforcement against organized crime 
have been recently reported. See U.S. O m a l s  Cite Key Successes in  War Against Or- 
anized Crime, N.Y. Times, Nov. 7,1983, at  Al, col. 1. Moreover, the government has 
teen extremely successful in recent years in prosecuting public officials without hav- 
ing to resort to scams and integrity tests. These include high federal officials; state 
governors; federal and state legislators and local councilmen; and a wide assortment of 
other public and political officials. Id. 
70. See Green v. United States, 454 F.2d 783,78486 (9th Cir. 1971). 
71. See United States v. Wgg, 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978). See also United States v. 
Tobias, 662 F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1981). cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1108 (1982) (government oper- 
ated chemical supply house for distribution to narcotics operations). 
72. United States v. Gonzales, 539 F.2d 1238, 1239 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. 
Reifsteck, 535 F.2d 1030, 1032 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. McGrath, 468 F.2d 1027, 
1027-28 (7th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 412 U.S. 936 (1973). 
73. Chaney v. Department of Law Enforcement, 74 Ill. App. 3d 424,393 N.E.2d 75 
(1979), a r d ,  82 Ill. 2d 289,412 N.E. 2d 497 (1980). 
74. United States v. Borum, 584 F.2d 424, 426 (D.C. Cir. 1978). See also United 
States v. Sam Goody, Inc., 506 F. Supp. 380 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (FBI established retail rec- 
ord store which purchased counterfeit records as part of an undercover investigation 
of such counterfeiting). 
75. See supra note 52. 
76. United States v. Brown, 635 F.2d 1207 (6th Cir. 1980) (commission of over forty 
burglaries); United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670 (2d Cir. 1973) (perjury, forgery, and 
Aling false instruments); People ex rel. Difanis v. Boston, 92 Ill. App. 3d 962,416 N.E.2d 
333 (1981) (soliciting prostitution). 
77. People v. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511,406 N.Y.S.2d 714,378 N.E.2d 78 (1978). 
78. United States v. Johnson, 565 F.2d 179 (1st Cir 1977), cert. h i e &  434 U.S. 1075 
(1981). 
79. United States v. Hinkle, 637 F.2d 1154 (7th Cir. 1981). 
80. United States v. Tobias, 662 F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1108 
(1982); United States v. Wgg, 558 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978). 
81. United States v. Ordner, 554 F.2d 24 (2d Cir 1977). cert. denie& 434 U.S. 824 
(1977). 
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I have previously suggested several legal methods of controlling in- 
vestigative excesses. One would be to require a warrant from a mag- 
istrate before certain types of undercover investigations could be 
conducted.82 A second method would be to eliminate some of the va- 
garies in making due process determinations of undercover opera- 
tions by providing a detailed set of criteria to serve as g~ideposts .~~ A 
third method would be to provide a broad entrapment statute that 
focuses not on the subjective predisposition of the defendant, but 
rather on law-enforcement officers' conduct, which would be evalu- 
ated in terms of its reasonableness, fairness, good faith, and resulting 
harm.84 
All of these proposals advance the overriding public policies of pro- 
tecting citizens against governmental misconduct and misuse of 
power.85 They incorporate many of the ingredients for a common law 
to control undercover police investigations. I envision the shape of 
this common law of "investigative misconduct" as emerging from an 
amalgam of several distinct legal doctrines and equitable principles. 
These doctrines and principles not only are firmly based in jurispru- 
dence, but also are supported by logic and morality. Such a proposal 
does not require any radical assertion of the balances of power be- 
tween coordinate branches of g~vernment .~~ On the contrary, it ne- 
cessitates only a modest reassertion of the status and independence 
of the judiciary - which the judiciary gradually has abdicated - to 
impose meaningful restraints on the law-enforcement activities of 
the Executive Branch. In this respect, ABSCAM, quite apart from its 
dramatic revelations of the power and effectiveness of undercover po- 
lice work, has far greater significance because of its impact on our 
constitutional form of g~vernment.~' Specifically, ABSCAM has af- 
fected the doctrines of entrapment, supervisory powers, due process, 
and of the fourth and fifth amendments. The equitable principles that 
interact with these doctrines are clean hands, judicial control of law- 
enforcement excesses, and freedom from governmental oppression. 
Entrapment is easily one of the most controversial doctrines in 
criminal law because it reflects a deep-seated ambivalence over 
whether the defense should focus on the defendant's predisposition 
or on the government's investigative tactics.88 All courts find it repug- 
nant for law-enforcement officers to lure innocent persons into crime 
-- - - 
82. See Gershman, supra note 1, at 633-37. 
83. Id at 611-33. 
84. See Gershman, supra note 5, at 1585-90. 
85. Indeed, the roles of principle and public policy as legal forces justifying the 
departure from, or the reshaping of established rules, is a historical as well as a pru- 
dential fact. See R. DWO-, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 22-28 (1977). 
86. By way of contrast, such a radical alteration would indeed result from recent 
proposals seeking to broaden the common law. See, e.g., G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW 
FOR THE AGE OF S~ATUTES (1982). 
87. See Barlow, Entrapment and the Common Law: Is There a Place for the Ameri- 
can Doctrine of Entrapment?, 41 MOD. L, REV. 266 (1978). Mr. Barlow's analysis, while 
confined to the English criminal justice system, lends considerable force to my 
arguments. 
88. See, in this connection, the majority and concurring opinions in Sorrells v. 
United States, 287 U.S. 435,451 (1932); cJ id. at 45859 (Roberts, J. concurring); Sher- 
man v. United States, 356 U.S. 369,376-77 (1958). 
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through trickery and t e m p t a t i ~ n . ~ ~  But some judges also find it re- 
pugnant for such officers to use unfair tactics to inveigle any person 
into crime, regardless of the person's c~lpability.~o The clean-hands 
principle provides the equitable basis for an entrapment doctrine 
that focuses on the government's misconduct. It would bar from the 
court any party who has violated the law in connection with the 
transaction sought to be litigated.g1 Law-enforcement tactics that en- 
courage a crime merely to secure a prosecution are improper, and the 
government should not be allowed to benefit from such conduct by 
gaining a conviction. 
Focusing on the fairness of the government's conduct is also the 
principal concern of the supervisory-powers doctrine. This doctrine 
seeks to preserve the integrity of the administration of criminal jus- 
tice and to prevent future abuses by providing meaningful standards 
on the proper use of law-enforcement powerP2 When law-enforce- 
ment officials engage in investigative misconduct, this doctrine au- 
thorizes the courts to review and remedy such misconduct, 
regardless of whether an explicit constitutional guarantee is impli- 
cated. The supervisory-powers doctrine is a modern expression of the 
equitable principle of judicial control of police improprieties, such as 
the use of tactics designed to instigate rather than investigate 
crime.93 Several courts have applied this doctrine in censuring vari- 
ous types of law-enforcement excesses in conducting investiga- 
t i o n ~ . ~ ~  Regrettably, the Supreme Court's admonition against the 
judiciary's broad use of a "chancellor's foot vetomg5 has not only si- 
lenced those courts willing to assume a broad supervisory role, but 
- - 
89. See, e.g, Sorrells, 287 U.S. at  448. 
90. See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484,496 (1976) (Brennan, J. dissenting); 
United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 436-38 (1973) (Douglas, J. dissenting); United 
States v. Jannotti. 501 F. Suuu. 1182.1200 (E.D. Pa. 1980). rev'd 673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir.). 
cert denied, 457 U.S. 110.6 (i682); ~ & t e d  states v. ~elli , '539 F: supp. 363,376 (D.D.c: 
19821. rev'd 707 F.2d 1460 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 264 (1983). 
91. see. Olrnstead v. 'united states, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928)' (Brandeis, J, 
dissenting). 
92. In McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332,343 (1943), the Supreme Court pro- 
vided the theoretical and practical bases for this doctrine: 
A democratic society, in which resuect for the dirmitv of all men is central. 
naturally guards ag&t the misus; of the law eGorc'?ment process. Zeal in 
tracking down crime is not in itself an assurance of soberness of judgment. 
Disinterestedness in law enforcement does not alone prevent disregard of 
cherished liberties. Experience has therefore counseled us that safeguards 
must be provided against the dangers of the overzealous as well as the des- 
potic. The awful instruments of the criminal law cannot be entrusted to a 
single functionary. 
93. See Barlow, supra note 87, at  281. 
94. United States v. Russell, 459 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 411 U.S. 423 
(1973); United States v. Payner, 434 F. Supp. 113,125 (E.D. Ohio 1977), affd 590 F.2d 206 
(6th Cir. 1979) (per curiam), rev'd, 447 U.S. 727 (1980); United States v. Hogan, 712 F.2d 
757, (2d Cir. 1983). 
95. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423,435 (1973). 
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also most likely has encouraged more creative and excessive investi- 
gative "experiments" by the government. 
The due process clause, unlike the entrapment and supervisory- 
powers doctrines, is a dominant constitutional force to protect the 
moral values related to undercover police work, particularly the free- 
dom and integrity of the individual's will from governmental intru- 
sion and decepti0n.9~ As such, the due process clause mirrors the 
equitable principle that courts will not tolerate governmental oppres- 
sion, particularly oppression that seeks to undermine an individual's 
free will. The Supreme Court has referred to due process limitations 
on undercover police conductg7 and has acknowledged the relation- 
ship between due process and unfair and deceptive government be- 
havior that induces persons to commit crimes.98 Due process would 
provide the central pillar in a common-law edifice governing under- 
cover conduct. Investigative "fairness" would require examining 
many factors, including not only the government's need for the tactic, 
but whether the tactic was reasonably suited to the ends sought, and 
constituted a fair use of law-enforcement power. In addition, the 
kinds of social harms referred to by Professor Marx would be exceed- 
ingly relevant in assessing the permissibility of the tactic. 
The fourth and fifth amendments represent the final components of 
this new doctrine. They hardly are foreign to the jurisprudence of un- 
dercover investigations, although they have never been interpreted 
to offer significant protection. The Supreme Court has suggested that 
undercover methods that entice persons into crime are as objection- 
able as coerced confessions and unlawful searches.99 But this was in 
dictum, and apparently of fleeting significance. Clearly, the fourth 
and fifth amendments could offer extensive protection against certain 
kinds of undercover activities. The fourth amendment, as a safeguard 
against unreasonable intrusions, could be interpreted to provide an 
enlarged zone of privacy that law-enforcement officers would not be 
permitted to penetrate absent some factually articulable justifica- 
tions.loO The Court's treatment of undercover police cases totally ob- 
fuscates any rational understanding of notions of privacy and 
security. Because one assumes certain risks in ordinary social rela- 
tionships, should the government be allowed to add to those risks? Is 
there any significant difference in terns of privacy between planting 
an electronic "bug" and planting a human spy? Should not both 
equally require a judicial warrant? The fifth amendment's privilege 
against self-incrimination could be construed to embrace incriminat- 
ing statements induced by the police through subterfuge and deceit, 
as well as overt force.lOl Are deceit and physical force really that dif- 
96. See Gershman, supra note 1, at 596-601. 
97. Sherman v. United States. 356 U.S. 369.373 (1958). 
98. Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423; 437 (1959); COX v..huikiana, 379 U.S. 559,571 (1965). 
99. Shermap v. United States, 356 U.S. 369,372 (1958). 
100. Bovd v. united States. 116 U.S. 616.630 (1886): Osborn v. United States. 385 U.S. 
323,340-54-(1966) (Douglas, J.; dissenting), ~ee '~msterdam Perspectives on the Fourth 
Amendment, 58 MINN. L REV. 349,406-07 (1974). 
101. The Supreme Court rejected this fifth amendment claim in Hoffa v. United 
States, 385 U.S. 293, 302-03 (1966). However, it might be argued that an undercover 
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ferent in their capacity to coerce people to act against their own will? 
Deceit is far more subtle, and for that reason is perhaps far more ef- 
fective than force.102 
But one should not construe these two great amendments sepa- 
rately, or as antagonists, as Professor Levinson does.103 For by con- 
sidering them as mutually protective and reinforcing, rather than in 
isolation, an entirely new doctrine emerges.lo4 And if combined with 
the other important doctrines previously examined, this "penumbra" 
provides the principled basis for a new means to analyze covert in- 
vestigative conduct. Under this new doctrine, law-enforcement au- 
thorities' use of deceit and surreptitious intrusion into an individual's 
privacy without a judicial warrant or any factual basis for believing 
that the target is engaging in crime, for the express purpose of ex- 
tracting incriminating statements, or ensnaring the target into future 
criminal activity, should merit the same judicial censure as do illegal 
searches and confessions. Indeed, it is paradoxical that the Court has 
been so scrupulous in protecting fourth and fifth amendment rights 
even when the violation was largely technical and inadvertent,105 and 
yet has so steadfastly upheld deliberate, intrusive, outrageous, and 
illegal investigative conduct when no right traditionally associated 
with the fourth or fifth amendment has been jnfringed.lo6 
Applying this common law to undercover investigations would re- 
quire the courts to weigh values such as rationality, fairness, good 
faith, and harm under objective standards. This is not to say, how- 
ever, that artifice and deception cannot play a significant role in the 
investigation of crime or that covert operations cannot be imaginative 
and aggressive when directed at important, legitimate, and specific 
law-enforcement objectives. But distinctions and limitations must be 
made on the basis of reasonableness and fairness. Striking a true bal- 
ance between governmental power and individual freedom hinges on 
such distinctions and limits. For example, establishing a hidden 
checkpoint to detect intoxicated drivers may be an acceptable law- 
agent's pressing persons to talk into a concealed microphone might constitute suffi- 
cient compulsion as to implicate this constitutional protection. CJ United States v. 
Williams, 705 F.2d 603, 620 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 524 (1983) (although fifth 
amendment issue was not raised here, the court did indicate that government's in- 
former had coached defendant as to what he should say at meetings with undercover 
agents). 
102. S. BOK, LYING 18 (1978). 
103. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text. 
104. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,630 (1886). (Court recognized that at 
times the fourth and fifth amendments "run almost into each other"). 
105. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433,445-46 (1974); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 
403 U.S. 443,449 (1971). 
106. See suwa note 66. See also Ham~ton v. United States. 425 U.S. 484.490-91 (1976) 
(when defendant is predisposed to &el his constitutionalkghts are not violat'ed by 
the police engaging in illegal activity); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 43536 
(1973) (when defendant is predisposed to crime, government's act of supplying essen- 
tial ingredient for illegal narcotics does not constitute entrapment). 
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enforcement practice, whereas establishing a checkpoint to detect 
expired registrations may not be; having an undercover officer pose 
as a potential mugging victim may be an acceptable police tactic, 
though having that same officer sprawl out on the pavement with 
hundred-dollar bills protruding from his pocket may not be; the un- 
dercover purchase of narcotics often is permissible, but establishing 
elaborate drug manufacturing operations to attract new criminals or 
distributing narcotics into new channels of society is totally imper- 
missible and irresponsible; and spying on persons engaged in, or 
about to commit, a crime may be acceptable, particularly when ac- 
companied by judicial authorization, whereas spying on persons not 
engaged in present or future crime is not only unacceptable, but is 
the kind of insidious activity historically practiced by totalitarian re- 
gimes to maintain power.lo7 
"The grand purpose of the law is to make business for itself," the 
narrator states in Bleak House. lo* Law-enforcement authorities have 
more than enough crime-fighting work to keep themselves busy and 
have a considerable arsenal of crime-fighting weapons with which to 
do this work, without needing to generate new business. While the 
press and public may be infatuated today with ABSCAM-like opera- 
tions and ambitious law-enforcement officials continue to reap head- 
lines through the use of this type of investigation, society must not 
become shortsighted about the implications of these techniques. 
Once these new undercover experiments take hold and the public be- 
comes conditioned to accept them as legitimate, it will become in- 
creasingly more difficult to abolish them.log And by a process of 
gradual accretion, American society may be heading toward that "to- 
talitarian fortress" about which Professor Marx warns. ABSCAM Eth- 
ics is an important contribution to the type of thoughtful discussion 
needed to avoid that result. 
107. See H. ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 430-31 (1973). 
108. C. DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE 416 (Riverside ed. 1956). 
109. However, as this book review was going to press, a majority of the Subcommit- 
tee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Judiciary Committee attacked FBI 
undercover operations and called for legislation to require the bureau to detain judi- 
cial warrants before beginning them. N.Y. Times, May 2,1984 at A23, coL 1. 
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